Confidentiality and Cooperation with Law Enforcement Authorities in International Arbitration


Abstract: This article addresses confidentiality in international arbitrations against the background of suspicions of transnational criminal offenses (corruption, bribery, tax evasion or money laundering) or issues of a regulatory nature, arising during an arbitration procedure. It also discusses the scope and limits of confidentiality agreements and the powers of arbitral tribunals to accept amicus curiae intervention while focusing on the role played by the European Commission in the BIT’s and its impact on the future of arbitration. Our analysis also takes into account the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, as model rules, and assesses whether an international standard of cooperation with law enforcers exists in international arbitration lato sensu.


Key words: international arbitration, money laundering, corruption, confidentiality, transparency, public interest, regulatory frameworks, duty to cooperate, European Union, European Commission, BIT’s, law enforcement authorities.